PUD Board meeting Monday, September 7, 2026 · 3:00 PM. Public comment is open — attend in person or join by Zoom →

Resilience through diversity

Resilience is not one perfect network. It is layers.

Okanogan County should never depend on one cable, one tower system, one satellite company, or one kind of technology. Fiber gives us a durable, high-capacity backbone. Local wireless extends it across the rural county and keeps technicians, equipment, and accountability close to home. Starlink reaches the gaps and gives us an independent path when fire damages local infrastructure. Each layer fails differently — that is the point.

Fiber where it makes sense. Wireless where it reaches. Starlink where the others cannot.

What the fires taught us

We already know what a single point of failure looks like.

Okanogan County has repeatedly lost essential communications during major fires. This isn't a hypothetical about which technology is safest — it's the county's own record.

Cold Springs Fire, 2020 — 911 rerouted out of county for ~12 hours

The fire that took a one-year-old child's life also burned the fiber network and 700+ power poles, destroying mountaintop sites that carried service for phone and internet providers, county Public Works, and emergency communications for fire districts and hospitals. All 911 had to be rerouted out of the county for about 12 hours. The fatality and the communications collapse were the same event.

Carlton Complex, 2014 — 911 down for nearly five days

When the fire burned the fiber, local, long-distance, internet, and 911 went down for nearly five days. Power was out for weeks in the hardest-hit areas. One town's mayor "couldn't reach the police chief to initiate a Level 2 evacuation" — he had to find him in person on the street.

The lesson is not that fiber failed and satellite never would, or that towers are safe and cables are weak. Any communications path can fail. The dangerous condition is different:

The danger isn't that a route fails. It's having no independent path left when it does.

And the way we warn people now makes this sharper. A Wireless Emergency Alert — the evacuation push to your phone — only arrives if you're in range of a live cell tower. A tower that's burned, out of power, or in one of the county's dead zones sends nothing. That is exactly why more than one independent path matters.

Okanogan's fire record — the evidence
FireYearAcresWhat happened
Carlton Complex2014256,108Then the largest single wildfire in Washington history; 353 homes lost; 911 down nearly five days.
Okanogan Complex2015304,782Five fires; three firefighters killed in the Twisp River Fire.
Cold Springs2020~189,000A 1-year-old child died fleeing it; 78 homes lost; 911 rerouted out of county ~12 hours.
Pearl Hill2020~223,730Jumped from Cold Springs the same night, into Douglas County.

Three separate fire episodes of 190,000–300,000+ acres in a single seven-year stretch; the county holds Washington's records for its largest wildfires. Sources: InciWeb / Washington DNR; HistoryLink; Methow Valley News (Sept 16, 2020; July 31, 2014); Spokesman-Review / KING 5 (2020); FCC (Wireless Emergency Alerts).

The three-layer model

Three technologies. Three different strengths.

No single broadband technology is resilient enough to carry an entire rural county by itself. The safest future isn't picking one winner — it's preserving all three, because each covers the others' weaknesses.

Independent reach

Starlink

Fills the gaps · can stay up when local routes are damaged · deploys quickly to shelters and fire camps.

↑ each layer covers the others ↓

Local reach & accountability

Local wireless

Serves dispersed rural homes affordably · stocks and replaces gear locally · holds prices in check.

↑ each layer covers the others ↓

Durable foundation

Fiber

The backbone · near-unlimited capacity · a buried asset that lasts decades as the electronics upgrade.

Layered resilience does not mean three internet bills at every house. It means preserving three independent networks across the county — and connecting the places where an outage is most dangerous (the hospital, fire stations, evacuation centers) through more than one of them.
Layer 1 · the permanent spine

Fiber: the durable foundation, wherever it can be built affordably.

Fiber is the strongest long-term asset where the construction pencils out. The buried glass can stay useful for decades while the electronics at each end are refreshed — the backbone the whole system grows on.

It belongs in towns, denser corridors, tower backhaul, public facilities, businesses, and every rural pocket where grants or density make it practical. It should keep expanding. But the District's own projects show that reaching the most dispersed homes can cost tens of thousands of dollars per location — which makes universal fiber a long-term direction, not an immediate replacement for wireless. Fiber vs. wireless, in full →

What it does best

  • Extremely high capacity, low latency
  • A durable underground asset
  • Supports future technologies
  • The ideal backbone and dense-area last mile

What the other layers cover for it

  • Routes can be cut or burned
  • Aerial plant depends on poles
  • Remote construction is expensive
  • Restoration can mean excavation, splicing, or pole replacement
Layer 2 · the accountable rural layer

Local wireless: affordable reach, local hands, public accountability.

Local wireless carries the fiber backbone across mountains, valleys, and sparse roads where running a cable to every house isn't yet economical. Its gear ages too — but that aging can be managed as a fleet.

Equipment can be standardized, replacements stocked locally, technicians dispatched, and upgrades planned before systems go obsolete. The most important part isn't the radio spec — it's responsibility. A local provider and a public network can be asked: How many spares are on hand? Which towers have backup power? Which gear is near end of life? Who gets the hospital and the fire station back first? What will customers pay next year?

The wireless layer also keeps a locally accountable, at-cost option in the market — which helps discipline pricing and service across every provider, Starlink included. How the local yardstick holds rates down →

What it does best

  • Reaches dispersed homes affordably
  • Locally stocked and locally serviceable
  • Shares hardened tower infrastructure
  • Supports several local retail providers
  • A public price-and-service benchmark
  • Builds fiber backhaul that stays valuable later

What the other layers cover for it

  • Towers can lose power
  • An individual site can burn
  • Some terrain and tree cover can't be reached
  • Shared spectrum has finite capacity
  • Fiber backhaul routes can be cut
Layer 3 · the independent gap & backup

Starlink is strongest when it is not alone.

Starlink isn't the opponent in this plan — it's the third layer, and a genuinely valuable one. It reaches isolated properties that can't see a tower and may never justify their own fiber build, and because its path comes from the sky, it can keep working when a local tower, pole line, or fiber route is destroyed.

It can also be deployed in hours at shelters, work sites, fire camps, and damaged facilities. Its limitation isn't usefulness — it's what happens when it becomes the only layer. Each household is responsible for its own dish, cable, router, Wi-Fi coverage, power, mounting, account, and replacement. Over 15 years a countywide fleet accumulates aging supplies, weathered cable, obsolete routers, incompatible generations, and residents who can't reinstall gear themselves. Starlink fills gaps brilliantly; it shouldn't be forced to carry every risk by itself. The 15-year household-hardware problem →

What it does best

  • Reaches locations beyond terrestrial coverage
  • Independent of many local cable and tower routes
  • Rapidly deployable
  • Useful for temporary and mobile emergency sites
  • Gives consumers another competitive choice

Why it shouldn't be the only layer

  • Every household needs working equipment and power
  • Hardware and support are controlled remotely
  • No locally controlled replacement inventory is guaranteed
  • Trees and buildings can obstruct the sky
  • Consumer systems age independently
  • Prices and terms are set outside the county
  • A common platform failure can hit many terminals at once

On the platform-dependence and terms points, see the full, sourced treatment on the Starlink page (governance & service terms; the July 24, 2025 core-network outage; the 15-year lifecycle research). This page's claim is narrow: no one technology should be the county's only path.

Different failure domains

The value isn't that one never fails. It's that they don't fail the same way.

Resilience comes from uncorrelated failure. A second connection is most valuable when it doesn't depend on the same equipment, route, power system, company, or support process as the first.

When this happens…FiberLocal wirelessStarlink
A fiber route burns or is cutMay lose serviceMay reroute via other backhaul; some sites may failCan remain online
A tower site loses powerUsually unaffected where fiber reaches the homeThat sector may failCan stay up if the home has power
A household's own satellite gear failsUnaffectedUnaffectedThat household loses service
Trees or buildings block the skyUnaffectedDepends on the tower pathMay degrade or fail
A retail replacement shortageUnaffectedLocal inventory can be plannedReplacement may be delayed
A provider raises pricesOther providers remainLocal at-cost benchmark remainsCustomers can move between layers
A major satellite-platform outageUnaffectedUnaffectedThe satellite path fails
A local provider or the PUD serves people poorlyFiber & satellite remainPublic accountability + competition applyGives customers another choice
Long-term capacity growthExcellentUpgradeable, with practical limitsImproves with constellation investment

stays up   partial or conditional   that path fails. "May" and "can" are deliberate: outcomes depend on which route, site, or home is hit. No one technology is guaranteed to survive every major fire — which is the whole argument for keeping more than one.

A second path is worth most when it fails for entirely different reasons than the first.

Four scenarios

What layering actually looks like on a bad day.

Not every failure is a wildfire — but wildfire is where the stakes are highest. Here's how three independent layers behave when something goes wrong.

Scenario A · fire severs the valley fiber

A terrestrial fiber route is damaged and towers lose backhaul.

  • Fiber customers on the damaged route lose service.
  • Some wireless sites may also lose backhaul.
  • Starlink households and portable emergency kits can remain connected.
  • Wireless routes with alternate backhaul keep serving their areas.

Lesson: Starlink is a valuable independent emergency layer.

Scenario B · a tower burns

One local wireless site is destroyed.

  • Customers on that sector temporarily lose the local wireless path.
  • Fiber-connected properties stay online.
  • Starlink customers stay online if their home and power survive.
  • Local crews rebuild the tower while customers keep alternatives.

Lesson: Keeping Starlink and fiber prevents one tower from being the only path.

Scenario C · thousands of Starlink systems are 10–15 years old

A fire brings outages, generator use, and simultaneous household failures.

  • Some old power supplies and routers fail at once.
  • Some households can't reach support; retail stock is demanded all at once.
  • Compatible legacy parts may not be locally available.
  • Local wireless and fiber keep carrying residents whose dishes fail.

Lesson: The locally maintained layers protect the county from the aging-equipment problem.

Scenario D · one provider changes prices or service

A provider raises rates, adds restrictions, or gets hard to reach.

  • Customers can move to another technology.
  • Starlink keeps local providers from getting complacent.
  • Local wireless keeps Starlink from being the only rural price-setter.
  • Fiber sets a high-capacity benchmark where it's available.

Lesson: Redundancy improves outcomes even when nothing is burning.

Economic resilience & local control

Resilience is physical — and economic.

A communications system can fail its people even while every cable and radio still works: through unaffordable price increases, neglected maintenance, poor service, missing parts, discontinued gear, delayed upgrades — or a company deciding a sparse area isn't worth serving. Competition and local control protect against those failures too.

You don't have to take the campaign's word that connectivity is life-safety here. The PUD's own 2024 Wildfire Mitigation Plan lists, among reasons against shutting off power in a fire, the "negative impacts to emergency response and public safety due to disruptions to the internet and mobile phone service." It notes the District's fiber backbone "also supports the District's communication and SCADA needs" — dual-use grid infrastructure — and admits there are "areas that do not allow… radio, cell, or satellite phone communications." There are places here where even a satellite phone doesn't work.

That's why local control belongs in a resilience argument. Starlink gives rural customers leverage when a local provider performs poorly. Fiber gives businesses and denser communities a high-capacity alternative. And the PUD wireless network gives the rural majority a locally controlled option whose costs, inventory, upgrades, and policies can be questioned in public — and hardened, restored, and answered for by people who live here. No layer should be trusted without alternatives; each behaves better because the others exist. Rural self-reliance →

Competition is another form of backup — it gives people somewhere to go before high prices or neglected infrastructure becomes a crisis.

The long-term path

Wireless isn't the alternative to fiber. It's part of the path to it.

The three layers aren't frozen. Fiber keeps expanding where it pencils; wireless connects people now and builds the customer base and backhaul for later; Starlink keeps reaching the hardest places. The full fiber comparison →

Today

Fiber spine in towns & backhaul Wireless rural reach across the county Starlink fills the gaps

Next phase

Fiber more corridors & pockets Wireless upgraded as radios improve Starlink stays the independent backup

Long term

Fiber expands where affordable Wireless serves the high-cost edge Starlink covers the final gaps & emergencies

Some wireless subscribers migrate to fiber as construction becomes practical — and the towers and backhaul built for wireless stay useful as the fiber footprint grows. It's a path, not a fork.

When the power's out, too

Every layer needs power. Shared infrastructure lets us plan for it.

Wildfires and storms take the grid down with them, so what keeps you online runs on a battery or a generator. All three technologies need electricity somewhere — the difference is where the backup can be planned.

Fiber and wireless customers need power for a router and the ONT or radio. A Starlink dish draws roughly 50–75 watts continuously — and in winter it heats itself to melt off snow, which can roughly double that draw. Tower sites, fiber nodes, and satellite ground infrastructure all need power too.

The advantage of locally managed infrastructure is that backup power at shared towers and network sites can be budgeted, tested, fueled, and prioritized for the community — one hardened site keeps whole neighborhoods connected. Starlink adds an independent path, but each participating household must provide its own backup power. That's another reason to keep both: a backed-up tower supports many homes efficiently; a battery-backed dish keeps one home or emergency site online when that tower fails.

The honest version: in a long outage every home still needs a little power for its own radio and Wi-Fi either way, and a self-contained dish can carry one household through a short outage on a small battery. The community-scale advantage only holds if the utility actually invests in backup power at its towers and fiber — which is exactly the kind of commitment a local, accountable public network can be asked to make, and a distant company cannot.

Community backup and household backup solve different problems. A resilient county needs both.

Sources: independent watt-meter measurements of Starlink Standard dishes (~50–75 W typical; snow-melt heating adds ~50–100 W) — seabits.com and multi-owner metered reports (2024–2025); fixed-wireless tower backup-power practice — WISP operator documentation. Figures are typical ranges, not guarantees.

The resilient decision

Do not choose one network. Preserve the layers.

Okanogan County doesn't need to choose between fiber, wireless, and Starlink. We need fiber expanding where it's economical, Starlink reaching the gaps and standing ready when infrastructure fails, and the PUD wireless network maintained as the layer the county owns and can hold accountable.

Eliminating wireless wouldn't simplify this system — it would remove the only layer the county controls and can directly answer for, and push the dispersed majority toward a single distant option as their only path. In a county that has already watched 911 burn, the resilient decision is to:

  • upgrade the existing wireless network;
  • maintain local equipment and emergency spares;
  • strengthen backup power at critical sites;
  • keep extending fiber where grants and density support it;
  • encourage Starlink as an independent household and emergency option;
  • connect critical facilities through more than one technology wherever possible.

The goal isn't to prove one technology can't fail. It's to make sure no single failure can take everything with it. Keep Okanogan's local layer →