Prepared for the Okanogan County PUD Board of Commissioners
Reconsider the wireless pause — a sound investment, not a loss.
Stepping back from the wireless network is easier for the District. That is not the
same as better for the county. Every figure in this brief is drawn from the District's own audited
statements, billing records, and engineering workbooks — and together they make a different case than the
one the May 4 letter assumes.
Save Local Broadband · an independent, technology-neutral ratepayer effort
June 2026 · savelocalbroadband.com
On May 4, 2026 the District told retail providers it would make no further investment in the
wireless network unless subscriber counts rise first — a direction the Board approved with no market analysis and
without consulting the providers. Yet the District's own audited books show the telecom segment thriving — its net
worth more than doubled, $4.9M (2019) to $10.5M (2025), profitable every year but one. The one-time ~$1.2M upgrade
(about 1.5 years of surplus) was always affordable; the wireless platform was simply never funded, and its
hardware is now end-of-life. A decision of this consequence — and this premise — deserves a full, public review.
A What the letter says — and what the District's own records show
The letter says
"Subscription rates have steadily declined."
The record shows
Most of the decline is one reseller — not the market.
Of the past year's 355-subscriber drop, 52% is NCI Datacom alone, whose RSP
numbers collapsed after an out-of-area Core Fiber restructuring. Every other provider declined gently. The network proved
resilient through Starlink's cheapest-ever pricing — a drop concentrated in one reseller's account is the case for modernizing,
not against it.
The letter says
"A highly competitive marketplace."
The record shows
It's competitive because the District makes it so.
The 7+ local providers — plus NCI on its own towers — all compete on the District's open-access network. Step back and the
"marketplace" collapses toward one out-of-area private operator plus satellite, billed out of county. In the providers' own
logs Starlink is the largest single competitor but a minority — about 15% of
cancellations; most leave for moves, nonpayment, or seasonal vacancy. A market that
depends on the District isn't a reason to leave it.
The letter says
"Required to set rates to recover full cost… does not compete on price."
The record shows
True — and that settles recovery in the District's favor.
Cost-based ratemaking already recovers equipment cost, the same way it recovered the 2010 build. The District
needn't compete on price; its retail providers do, at no cost to the District — several are ready to match
Starlink. Keeping the wholesale network running is all that's required.
The letter says
Invest only "should future subscriber enrollment reach a level sufficient to offset the costs."
The record shows
That condition can never be met by waiting. Subscribers
will not climb on an end-of-life, 20 Mbps network — so inaction, not investment, is the larger risk: a one-time
~$1.2M outlay set against a recurring ~$1.1M/yr revenue line and a federally-funded public asset. "Wait and see"
guarantees the very decline it's trying to avoid.
$808,166
Audited telecom surplus, 2024 — up from $696,258 in 2023
~$1.1M/yr
Wireless revenue — about a third of telecom, steady 5 yrs
$10.5M
Telecom net position (2025) — more than doubled from $4.9M in 2019
~$1.2M
District's stated upgrade cost — ≈ 1.5 yrs of surplus
52%
of the 12-mo decline from one reseller (NCI)
15%
name Starlink — biggest single competitor, still a minority
~$9.2M
Federal funds that built the wireless network (2010)
~9–10 yr
Modeled discounted payback — within the gear's ~10–11-yr life
Save Local Broadband — Brief for the BoardPage 2 · Twenty-five years in the making
B Twenty-five years in the making — what this decision puts at risk
This network didn't appear on a spreadsheet. It was built over two decades, with real financial risk,
into something most rural counties can only envy: fast, local, competitive broadband that keeps the dollars and the
accountability at home. That history is the context the May 4 letter leaves out.
Public infrastructure, built for this county — on ground that took decades to claim.
2000
A pioneering bet
Okanogan helps found NoaNet — one of about ten Washington utility districts building open-access fiber, because private ISPs served the I-5 corridor and skipped the rural east.
2002
Wireless reaches the valley
The District builds an 82-mile backbone from Pateros to the Canadian border and lights up fixed wireless for homes, farms, and businesses.
2010
Federal partnership, local risk
A $5.5M grant and a $3.7M loan build ~170 wireless sites — debt the District took on and is steadily paying down. The network that still serves the county today.
2010s–today
A rare rural market
Eight competing local providers, ~3,800 customers, cost-based prices, and a real person to call — more choice than most cities. "One of the leading rural broadband solutions in Washington."
2024
Investment goes quiet
Capital spending flattens to $159K and the Cambium hardware reaches end-of-life. The slow decline begins.
May 2026
A crossroads
The Board pauses further wireless investment. After 25 years and real financial risk, the legacy is on the line.
Save Local Broadband — Brief for the BoardPage 3 · The decline, in the District's own data
C The decline is one reseller's RSP shift — not a market verdict
Both charts below are built from the District's own monthly "Telecom Report by RSP" files. The first overlays
the cause: the network's funding was cut years before subscribers fell — not when Starlink arrived. The
second shows the recent slide is concentrated in a single reseller whose RSP book dropped sharply after its Core Fiber restructuring.
The timing, overlaid: investment fell first, customers followed
Reinvestment (left axis) was cut 34% by 2023 — while the
subscriber base (right axis, zero-based) was still at its all-time peak. Customers
didn't begin leaving until mid-2024 — about 18 months later. And Starlink arrived in 2021, yet the base
grew for three years after. The District's own spending cut set the slide up first — the satellite and NCI's
RSP decline came later. The deepest cut landed while the base was healthiest, so it was a choice — and the $1.2M platform
upgrade was never budgeted at all.
Who actually left — change by reseller, past 12 months
NCI Datacom alone is 52% of the entire 355-subscriber decline — after its tie-up with Core Fiber, an
out-of-area, investor-owned consolidator. Every other reseller declined far more gently, and Will Connect ended the year
flat. This is not broad collapse of demand; it is one company's RSP book shifting after a change of ownership — the
strongest possible argument that the platform is healthy and worth modernizing.
Save Local Broadband — Brief for the BoardPage 4 · A legacy, not a line item
D This is a legacy you're managing — not a spreadsheet line
The history matters too — because it changes what "risk" means here. What this District built is,
frankly, a rural marvel: more competition and local choice than most American cities have, on infrastructure other
rural counties wish they had. It exists because earlier leaders took real financial risk when rural broadband was
anything but a sure thing.
A founding pioneer
In February 2000, Okanogan was one of about ten Washington utility districts that founded NoaNet —
now the state's largest open-access network, 3,800+ miles of fiber — created precisely because private ISPs
served the I-5 corridor and skipped the rural east. The District then built its own backbone and launched fixed
wireless in 2002.
Real risk — not free money
This wasn't all grants. For the 2010 build the District took on a ~$3.7M federal loan alongside a $5.5M
grant — debt it took on and has steadily paid down — and it reinvests its own telecom earnings into the network. Earlier
boards bet real money on an unproven model, and the bet paid off.
What the bet produced
Eight competing local internet providers serving ~3,800 customers — more real choice than most U.S. cities,
where one or two providers dominate. Cost-based prices, local accountability, a stable market, a $16.9M public
asset — and, in the District's own words, "one of the leading broadband solutions for rural communities in
Washington State."
The real risk isn't the $1.2M — it's losing what's already built.
The risky, expensive, pioneering work is done — and largely
paid down. What remains is a routine ~$1.2M equipment refresh: a fraction of the original bets, on
infrastructure that already exists, already earns ~$1.1M a year, and is already de-risked. Against that, the larger
risk is the one the letter never names — letting a 25-year, federally-funded public asset decay on end-of-life
hardware, and forfeiting the choice, competition, and market stability it took two decades and real financial
risk to build. Stepping back doesn't avoid risk; it takes the one risk you can't undo: losing the legacy.
That capacity is a 25-year stock, not a switch — let it go and it doesn't come back: Provo, Utah sold this same
open-access model for $1 once its providers were left to collapse.
Today's
commissioners weren't the ones who founded NoaNet in 2000 or built the network in 2010 — but they inherited the reward,
and they're now the stewards of whether that legacy continues. That isn't a spreadsheet decision; it's a decision about
whether to protect what this county built.
Save Local Broadband — Brief for the BoardPage 5 · The asset you own, and the competition
E The District's job isn't to own a monopoly — it's to keep the market competitive
This decision isn't about protecting a monopoly; the District doesn't have one and never did. NCI has
competed for years with its own towers — it even pulled ahead on speed, advertising at least 600/50 Mbps on Eder
Mountain while the District sold 20 Mbps. The District's customers stayed — the base held at peak levels through late 2023 — anyway. The real asset is the thing that
made that competition possible in the first place.
What the District provides
An open-access public backbone — an 82-mile fiber line, Pateros to the border, feeding wholesale wireless that
7+ local providers resell and compete over on price and service. That's real competition and local choice —
more than most American cities have — and it keeps rates honest. (The District leases its tower sites; the asset
that matters is the public fiber and the open-access model on top of it.)
What the pause leaves
Freeze the network on end-of-life gear and the District drops out of the competition. What's left is
one out-of-area, investor-owned operator (NCI/Core Fiber) as the dominant player — with no public
alternative to keep rates in check. That isn't a stable market; it's a monopoly risk, and the rates that
come with it.
Keeping that market competitive and rates fair is the PUD's mandate — the
reason public utility districts exist. Modernizing keeps the District in a competition that has served ratepayers for two
decades; the pause forfeits the market to a single private operator.
On StarlinkA backstop — not a like-for-like replacement.
Satellite suits the truly remote and is a fine backup, but it is not an equivalent substitute for a network the public
owns. To be candid, congestion isn't the concern in a county this sparse — the concern is dependence, control, and
cost. Starlink is a subscription to a fleet one out-of-state company must relaunch indefinitely
(satellites deorbit in ~5 years; even "gigabit" rides on a rocket still in testing); its price is set with no local rate
board, the service is sold "as is" and "not mission-critical," and a single software fault took ~6M users in 140
countries offline on July 24, 2025. Every dollar leaves the county. Starlink is already a minority of departures
here (~15%); a modernized local tier matches its cheapest plan with a local technician and dollars
kept in-county. Investment holds the ground; retreat cedes it to one distant company.
On NCI's grant & build-outOne out-of-area, investor-owned operator as the only game in town is not a competitive market.
Competition with NCI is healthy — it has been the status quo for years, and ratepayers benefited from it. The danger isn't
that NCI competes; it's that without the District, NCI becomes the only option — a single, out-of-area,
investor-owned operator (now folded into Core Fiber) with no public network to keep its rates honest. Open
access — multiple local providers competing on one public backbone — is the opposite of that, and it's what the pause
throws away. And note: most of the recent decline is concentrated in NCI's RSP book after the Core Fiber
restructuring — one reseller's account, not a platform-wide loss of demand. If the rationale rests on a specific Okanogan wireless grant to NCI,
that award isn't in the public record — the District should put the document forward.
Save Local Broadband — Brief for the BoardPage 6 · A long-standing competitor — and a lower-risk start
NCI has competed across this network for years. The pause forfeits that market — so phase the build, don't kill it
NCI Datacom owns its own towers and competes across the District's footprint — head-to-head on the
same ridgetops in the south, and on shared, leased sites elsewhere (it advertises at least 600/50 Mbps on Eder Mountain,
where the District sold 20 Mbps — and the District's customers there stayed anyway). Every one of the District's seven
sites is leased, not owned. This is a real, long-standing competitive market, and the District's open-access
network is what keeps the county's other providers in it. Here is where NCI's own towers reach the seven.
Where NCI's own towers reach the District's seven
| PUD tower |
Customers |
Nearest NCI own-tower |
Competitive status |
| Jackass Butte |
132 |
Jackass Butte ~0 km |
NCI on same ridgetop |
| Coleman |
170 |
Coleman Butte ~0 km |
NCI on same ridgetop |
| Nortons |
83 |
Tonasket Tower ~0 km |
NCI on same ridgetop |
| Shellrock |
44 |
Omak (KOMW) ~1.3 km |
NCI on same ridgetop |
| Eder |
241 |
Eder Mt (co-located) ~0 km |
Shared site · NCI competes |
| Number Hill |
83 |
Eder Mt (co-located) ~3.5 km |
Shared site · NCI competes |
| Pickens |
125 |
Tonasket Tower ~9.9 km |
Shared site · NCI competes |
The District leases all seven of these sites — it owns none of its towers. Three are co-located head-to-head
with NCI on the same ridgetop (Coleman, Jackass Butte, Nortons). The rest are shared / leased: Eder is
private land where NCI runs its own tower advertised at least 600/50 Mbps; Pickens is the Okanogan County TV-district mountaintop (shared with
translators and a Day Wireless tower); Number Hill is leased from the City of Oroville. NCI also runs sites near
Twisp (~41 km) and in Ferry County. Fixed-wireless access points use unlicensed bands that don't appear in FCC
license data, so siting is from the resellers' direct local knowledge plus FCC records where available.
A proof of conceptPhase the build by payback — start where every dollar reaches the most customers.
We want all seven built; in principle the whole network should be modernized. But as a phased compromise that meets
the Board's risk concern head-on: start where the payback is fastest — the towers with the lowest capital cost per
customer: Eder, Jackass Butte, Coleman. That's
543 of 878 customers (62%)
for about $658,597. It's anchored by Eder — the District's single biggest site, and the
place where NCI's own tower — at least 600/50 Mbps — already proves people will pay for real speed. Modernize there and the District
can finally compete for that demand instead of conceding it. Prove the model on the fastest-payback sites, then extend to
the rest — where the District's open-access network is what keeps the county's other providers able to compete with
NCI at all.
Save Local Broadband — Brief for the BoardPage 7 · More than a balance-sheet decision
F The PUD can stabilize prices — even against Starlink
The pause weighs one thing: whether the wireless line pays back fast enough. But a public utility holds
responsibilities a balance sheet can't show — and on three of them, stepping back costs the county far more than the
upgrade ever would. These are the reasons public utility districts exist in the first place.
A price check — even on StarlinkIf Starlink tripled its price, the PUD is the county's answer.
Washington created its PUDs in 1930, in a Grange-led ballot measure, because private power companies were
charging rural families more than double the urban rate and skipping the countryside altogether. A District's
founding purpose is to stabilize a market the private sector under-serves — and this District has done exactly that for
25 years; what changed isn't the mission, only that the gear fell behind. Broadband is the same story: where the local
network fades, the only option left is a satellite priced and controlled from out of state — no local rate board, free to raise prices at will. If it doubled or tripled its price tomorrow, a county with a working local network has an answer; one without it simply pays — the District can't set Starlink's price, but a public, at-cost option is what keeps the squeeze in check.
A life-safety service — in fire countryFor much of the county, home internet is the only phone — including 911.
Across much of Okanogan County — the largest county in the state, about eight people per square mile — there is
no reliable cell signal and landlines are mostly gone, so home internet is the phone: Wi-Fi calling, VoIP, and
911. And this is wildfire country. The 2014 Carlton Complex was the largest single wildfire in Washington
history; in the 2020 Cold Springs Fire a cell tower burned to the ground and 911 was rerouted out of county for
about twelve hours. No one knows this better than the District — after the 2014–15 fires its own
crews reported radio, phone, cell, and fiber "all down," with sixty miles of its fiber and wireless lost. No
technology is fireproof — but a locally owned, maintained network is a layer of resilience this county has needed
before.
An ecosystem — not a product linePausing investment pulls the floor out from a local industry the District built.
This network isn't one company's product; it's a marketplace the District built. Because Washington law for two decades allowed
PUDs to sell broadband only at wholesale (retail authority came only in 2021), the District created an open-access network that eight independent
local providers compete on — public infrastructure, private competition. It's the model Washington is known for
nationally: open-access markets here average about seven providers, and Okanogan has eight — more real choice
than most American cities. Seven of them resell on these wireless towers, with no other way to reach those
customers. A utility doesn't only serve customers; it stewards the market it created — over twenty-five years, here.
The deeper question — the one only the Board can answer — is whether Okanogan
County PUD still sees itself as the steward of a market, a safety net, and a quarter-century public legacy, or as
the operator of a line item it can switch off.
The District's peers keep investingThey're expanding their networks; Okanogan paused the wireless its rural majority relies on.
Jefferson County PUD put about 40% of its 2026 capital budget (over $15M) into broadband; Kitsap is building on
a $15M federal award plus a state match; Pend Oreille County PUD — a rural open-access PUD like Okanogan, built on
a federal stimulus grant — was just awarded a fresh ~$12.4M federal award plus a state match to expand fiber, and
still runs a wireless layer of its own. All are open-access public utilities, like Okanogan — and all are
growing their networks. Okanogan is the one pausing its wireless layer. (And its own $30M fiber grant?
$0 spent in two years, now moving to rescind it (Res. 1863, June 2026) — so "we're still investing" doesn't cover the ~2,700 customers on wireless.)
Save Local Broadband — Brief for the BoardPage 8 · The path forward — never offered
You demanded commitments — but never said what, or how
Asked what it would take to reinvest, the District said it would consider it only if customers "signed
contracts." Fair as a condition — but the May 4 letter defined no commitment, set no threshold, and gave no one a
way to sign anything. Yet the demand is already there: more than 100 former customers told a local provider they
would return if the network were modernized — most citing its lack of any forward trajectory, not a single speed or
price. A "commitment" can take several forms, and every one of them works here.
Who carries the risk? Pick any — or split it three ways.
The customer
A small construction adder on the monthly bill once it's built — about $5–$15/mo over 12 yrs. It rides the account, not the property, so renters qualify. Nobody pays until it's delivered.
The providers (RSPs)
The District's actual customers — the local ISPs — guarantee the wholesale purchase per tower and take the demand risk themselves; households commit to nothing. They've said they're willing. The cleanest fit for a wholesale network — and it removes the District's capital risk outright.
The District
It simply does the upgrade, as it has for 25 years: a one-time ~$1.2M from a profitable segment (~1.5 yrs of surplus), recovered through ordinary wholesale revenue — bounded, one-time, against a recurring ~$1.1M/yr line.
All three
Split it: the District funds the shared towers (~$371K); providers commit to a minimum take per tower; customers cover only their own radio (~$5.50/mo). Divided three ways, every piece is small.
What a household would actually commit to — tower by tower
| Tower site |
Customers |
Per customer |
If customer-funded (~/mo) |
| Eder |
241 |
$1,139 |
~$8/mo |
| Jackass Butte |
132 |
$1,187 |
~$8/mo |
| Coleman |
170 |
$1,338 |
~$9/mo |
| Number Hill |
83 |
$1,361 |
~$9/mo |
| Nortons |
83 |
$1,504 |
~$10/mo |
| Pickens |
125 |
$1,509 |
~$10/mo |
| Shellrock |
44 |
$2,122 |
~$15/mo |
| All seven |
878 |
$1,342 |
~$9/mo |
"If customer-funded" spreads a tower's full cost over its customers as a monthly adder over 12 years
(lower over 20). If the District funds the shared towers, each household covers only its own radio (~$5.50/mo).
Nobody pays until it's built. (Full per-tower costs & payback on the next page.)
Other Washington PUDs already do all of thisThe District didn't lack a path — it declined to offer one.
Mason PUD 3 builds a "fiberhood" at a 75% sign-up, recovered through a $25/mo bill adder (renter-friendly);
Kitsap PUD and Ammon, ID use a petition → property assessment for owner-occupied areas; Grays Harbor
PUD projected a 40% take rate on its latest phase and got ~78%. None of them paused. Define the commitment, set the
threshold, put the District on a build timeline, and pick any model above — the providers are ready to sign, and the
customers are ready to return.
Save Local Broadband — Brief for the BoardPage 9 · The money was never the problem
This was a stewardship choice — not a money problem
We placed the District's audited financial statements beside its budgets. The telecom business is
not struggling: its audited net worth more than doubled — from $4.9M (2019) to $10.5M (2025) — with a surplus
every year but one ($808,166 in 2024 alone). Yet the District never funded the $1.2M wireless upgrade while
its capital and attention flowed to a federally-funded fiber program. That $1.2M is roughly 1.5 years of
this segment's surplus. And it is a lean network to run — $0 for internet transit, and just $34,700/yr to lease
all nine tower sites (the biggest, Eder, is free). Affordability was never the issue — priorities were.
One business, two opposite trends
Net worth — audited, and doubling
$4.9M (2019) → $10.5M (2025), profitable every year but 2019 (Note 9). A healthy, growing business.
Wireless reinvestment — collapsing
$330K (2021) → ~$26K (2026). Part tracks falling subscribers — but the $1.2M platform upgrade was never budgeted at all.
They didn't need a savings rate — just bank what the wireless line had left over
Not a hypothetical: the wireless line's actual yearly leftover (after its debt, reinvestment, and a
full revenue-share of shared staff), banked as it came in: $158K→$336K→$626K→$940K→$1.33M by 2025
— clearing the $1.2M cost in five years, no grant, loan, or rate increase. Even banking half funds it inside
the gear's life. Leftover is modeled (the standalone wireless margin isn't separately reported); but its growth tracks
the documented reinvestment decline, and it reconciles with the audited $808K segment surplus.
They can save for capital — and the law says they shouldThe tools were always there.
The District keeps a $10 million Rate Stabilization Reserve — raised from $6M — and managed a $34.8 million bond
construction fund — it plainly knows how to reserve for large capital. And RCW 54.16.330 requires telecom
revenues to be dedicated to building and maintaining telecom facilities and paying their debt. The wireless
network is one of those facilities; that money was the telecom system's to spend on itself — and it went to
fiber. (We allege no hidden cash and no wrongdoing: electric and telecom share one
reporting fund, and funding fiber is lawful. The point is stewardship — a thriving public business that chose not to
maintain the network its rural majority relies on, then called a $1.2M upgrade unaffordable.)
Save Local Broadband — Brief for the BoardPage 10 · Does it pay for itself? & the ask
G Recouping the cost — modeled on the District's own numbers
The ~$1.2M upgrades seven tower sites serving 878 customers — about $1,200 all-in per customer (~$1,340 spreading the full 1,035-radio budget over today's 878),
returning the District's proposed $40/mo wholesale rate (~$480/yr). At an estimated operating cash margin
(~45–50% — derived from the audited operating income by adding back non-cash depreciation; the 24.9% net figure is after that depreciation), it pays back in about 5–7 years on an undiscounted
simple-payback basis — a discounted median ~9–10 years in the rebuilt model — inside the equipment's ~10–11-year life (the gear it replaces lasted ~16). It is also affordable today: ~$1.2M is
about 1.5 years of the segment's surplus, funded from telecom, not electric rates.
What the ~$1.2M buys — and when each tower pays for itself (the District's own workbook)
| Tower site |
Customers |
Upgrade cost |
Per customer |
Payback, alone* |
| Eder • phase 1 |
241 |
$274,499 |
$1,139 |
~5.3 yr |
| Jackass Butte • phase 1 |
132 |
$156,713 |
$1,187 |
~5.5 yr |
| Coleman • phase 1 |
170 |
$227,385 |
$1,338 |
~6.2 yr |
| Number Hill |
83 |
$112,952 |
$1,361 |
~6.3 yr |
| Nortons |
83 |
$124,863 |
$1,504 |
~7 yr |
| Pickens |
125 |
$188,575 |
$1,509 |
~7 yr |
| Shellrock |
44 |
$93,383 |
$2,122 |
~9.8 yr |
| All seven |
878 |
$1,178,370 |
$1,342 |
~6.2 yr |
Every tower pays for itself inside the gear's ~10-year life — the lowest-cost sites fastest, so a
phased build starts with Eder, Jackass Butte, and Coleman (543 of 878 customers for ~$659K). *Standalone
payback at the proposed $40/mo tier and an est. ~45% cash margin; growth or tiered pricing only speeds it (the single
$40 tier actually caps recovery). Two tailwinds: wholesale revenue per subscriber is up ~8% even as the
base shrank, and Washington's own BEAD plan put 47.5% of its funding into fixed wireless (largest award ~$332M,
to a fixed-wireless provider).
Share of the upgrade cost recovered, over time
Even the worst case — a lower margin and a full NCI exit — recovers inside the
equipment's life; the District's plan lands at ~5.4 years on an undiscounted simple-payback basis (a discounted median
~9–10 years, still within the gear's ~10–11-year life), and tiered pricing (the hardware supports 500 Mbps)
would speed it further and earn more over the asset's life. The single proposed $40 tier actually caps
recovery — pricing is a retail decision the providers, not the District, should make.
Save Local Broadband — Brief for the BoardPage 11 · Pricing & the ask
One rate caps the top of the market
| Blended wholesale rate |
Simple payback (undiscounted) |
Extra lifetime revenue |
| $40 — single tier | ~5.6 yr | — |
| $45 blended — modest premium mix | ~5.0 yr (11% faster) | ~+$0.5M |
| $48 blended — strong premium mix | ~4.7 yr (17% faster) | ~+$0.8M |
To be clear: the $40 base is fair — about 25% cheaper in real terms than the 2009 rate,
and on cost-based math a sub-$40 tier is genuinely hard. The forfeit is at the top: the hardware "could
comfortably offer 500 Mbps" (the District's words), the ~1-in-3 who buy the fastest tier elsewhere (OpenVault)
have nothing to buy, and the District's own billing shows customers migrating up-tier for five straight years (the
20 Mbps ceiling tier grew 635 → 1,033). Premium and business plans above the base recover
the upgrade faster — roughly $0.5–0.8M more over the gear's life — and give providers an
upsell path as customers' needs grow.
H What we respectfully ask of the Board
- Revisit this decision — the wireless network is a profitable line worth modernizing, not a loss to shed.
- Publicly release the financial and engineering analysis the Board relied on when it voted.
- Place reconsideration on a public agenda, with an opportunity for public comment.
- Build to demand, as other WA PUDs do — phase the upgrade with neighborhood pledges and beneficiary-pays financing (Mason PUD 3, Kitsap PUD), starting with the lowest-cost-per-customer towers.
- Consult the retail providers — who were not asked before this decision — in shaping that plan.
- Put a date and a budget on the "pause" — a specific review trigger tied to enrollment at the lowest-cost sites, so deferral can't become cancellation by default.